Syllabus

Author
Affiliations

Sachin S. Pandya

University of Connecticut

Published

October 13, 2025

This course is an introduction to the principles of tort liability for personal injuries and property damage in the United States. Topics include negligence, tort liability without fault, tort liability for defective products, and intentional torts.

Section 01
Monday/Wednesday
August 25 - December 3, 2025
11 am - 12:30 pm ET
Chase 210
HuskyCT

Course Details

Required Readings: John Fabian Witt and Karen M. Tani, Torts: Cases, Principles, and Institutions (CALI eLangdell Press, 7th ed. 2025). Free download here with an option to buy a paperback copy at cost. Get the other readings via syllabus hyperlinks or the HuskyCT course website. For the final exam, I’ll act as if you’ve read all the assigned readings even if we don’t discuss some of them in class.

Class Discussion: If you are “on call” during a class meeting, I’ll likely ask you to speak at some point during that class meeting about the topics or materials for that class. I typically select students to be “on call” based on alphabetical order by surname or at random. Of course, I welcome questions and comments regardless of whether you are “on call”.

Software: Browser that supports HuskyCT (verify here) and the Blackboard mobile app. I also expect proficiency with spreadsheet software (e.g., Excel), as is now expected of lawyers. UConn students can use Excel and other Micrsoft 365 applications on their personal devices for free using their UConn email address and NetID password.

Learning Objectives: Students should be able to: (1) explain and employ basic rules and concepts of US tort law; (2) analyze, synthesize and apply legal principles drawn from judicial, statutory, other sources covered in the course; (3) build and critique legal arguments, identify and evaluate counter-arguments, and think critically about existing legal rules and possible alternatives; (4) identify salient legal issues, given a set of facts; and (5) know the basic procedural motions often used in tort litigation.

Grades: The final course grade is based on a open-notes closed-book three-hour blind-graded written exam, as adjusted, at the instructor’s discretion, by the quality of class participation. Exam date and time: TBD. Here is the mandatory final course grade distribution for required first-year courses: {A (10-15%), A- (15-20%), B+ (25-30%), B (25-30%), B- (10-15%), C+ and below (0-5%)}. In-class participation, as well as timely and full completion of any class assignments, but not class absences, affect the class-participation component of the final course grade. Unless otherwise indicated, class assignments are ungraded so you can use them as low-stress tools to help you understand the material.

Attendance: Under law school policy, I, as the course instructor, must record class attendance and may deny course credit due to excessive absence. For this course, I presume excessive absence if a student does not attend, in whole or in part and absent a valid excuse, six or more class meetings. Also, I must receive any claim of a valid excuse for an absence (e.g., illness, household emergency) before the absence occurs. If denied course credit for excessive absence, the Registrar will so indicate on the student’s transcript, but such student will remain financially responsible for such course credit. I’ll primarily record attendance in class via HuskyCT.

Recording and Copyright: US law, including copyright law, protects my lectures, notes, tutorials, and displays. Students may take notes in my class, but only for making one set of notes for their own personal use and no other use. Lectures (classroom audio and projected slides) are or will be typically recorded and posted for this course on the course website for personal use by students and no other use. Absent my prior permission, you may not copy any such recording or any other material, provide copies of either to anyone else (including, for example, posting copies of such material on the Internet), or make any commercial use of them.

Academic Misconduct: You are bound by the law school’s Academic Misconduct Policy, and also taken to know your duties under that policy. You may not collaborate or give or receive academic aid while taking or completing any exam, quiz, assignment or any other assessment (graded or not) that I may require in this course, unless I specifically and expressly authorize otherwise. This prohibition also bars communication about any such assessment between a person who has already taken or completed such assessment and a person who has not yet done so. If you violate the Academic Misconduct Policy, you may be less likely to be found to have the requisite good moral character and/or fitness to obtain a license to practice law. See, e.g., Connecticut Bar Examining Committee Regulations art VI-11(iii).

Disability Accommodations: Students who require accommodations should contact the Law School’s Student Affairs Office in OneStop (Library 2nd floor) or at law.access@uconn.edu.

Mental Health: Students can find support and resources through the Office of Student Affairs (Library 2nd floor). Also, students can make an appointment with the law school’s mental health counselor and engage in confidential conversations or seek recommendations or referrals for any mental health or psychological concern.

Policy on Discrimination, Harassment, and Related Interpersonal Violence. See here.

Learning and Well-Being: The first semester of law school can feel like a marathon up a steep (learning) curve at high altitude. Pace yourself, and soon you’ll acclimate. That includes scheduling time to rest, relax, and recharge. That also means that, if you or your family get sick or face an unexpected challenge, you aren’t alone. Come to me for help, and we’ll figure out what to do together.

Student Meetings: Fridays by appointment in Hosmer 308 or my WebEx virtual office. Email me if you want to set up an appointment to meet outside of the regularly-scheduled student-meeting times.

Readings

Here is the tentative sequence of the topics, readings, and other assignments that we’ll cover. Please complete the assignments (including audio, video) before the course meeting on that topic. Unless otherwise indicated, page numbers (“p.” or “pp.”) refer to the Witt and Tani book (“WT”) and “course website” refers to the HuskyCT course website. Materials marked optional are highly recommended but not required. For fans of reading hard copies, pdf files of some of the assigned court opinions are posted on the course website.

1: Introduction

This is an introduction to American tort law and the tort-claiming system in the United States. US tort law is distinctive in three main ways. First, US tort law tends to come not from a civil code, but judge-made law (“common law”) as it appears in published appellate court opinions. By operation of the norms of precedent and stare decisis, these past decisions are supposed to constrain judges in how they decide cases. Second, tort law is largely State law, and thus varies among the 50 States in the US. Accordingly, we discuss whether a tort doctrine is a “majority rule” (> 25 States follow it) or a “minority rule” (< 25 States follow it). Third, US law assigns fact-finding in civil litigation largely to juries. This affects both substance and procedure in US tort litigation.

  1. An Introductory Case: The Tort of Battery (WT, pp. 1-10, including Vosberg)
  2. Lewis (2019) (optional)
  1. Torts - Introduction (video, course website)
  2. Legal Reasoning and Reading - Introduction (video, course website)

2: The Parties and Liability

In many cases, tort doctrines allow more than one possible person to sue as a defendant, i.e., not just the person closest in time and space to the plaintiff’s injury, but also another who may be held liable for, or for acting with, that person. Here, we primarily discuss three such doctrines: respondeat superior, civil conspiracy, and aiding-abetting liability. We also touch upon the possibility that an injured victim may directly sue the tortfeasor’s liability insurance company.

  1. Vicarious Liability
  2. Acting in Concert: Civil Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting
  3. Actions Against Liability Insurers

3: Compensatory Damages

“Compensatory damages” denotes a type of money award in tort cases that, when paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, is supposed to put the plaintiff in the position it would have been in the counterfactual world in which the defendant had not committed the tort. Here, we discuss different kinds of compensatory damages, difficulties associated with calculating the proper amount of such damages in any particular case, and the role of insurance.

  1. Pecuniary Damages (WT pp. 640-643: Feldman + note 1; WT pp. 650-651: note 2; Soffen, 2016); Calif. Civil Code § 3361; Va. Code § 8.01-419; S. 2190, 119th Cong. (2025)(optional); Expected Value of a Lawsuit tutorial.

  2. Lump Sum vs. Periodic Payments: Connecticut General Statutes § 52-225d(a)-(c) (periodic payment statute); Structured Settlements (McCoy 2015); Discounting to Present Value tutorial.

  3. Nonpecuniary Damages: Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498 (1961) (on damages issue only, and Traynor dissent); WT, pp. 653-56); Survey: The Trolley Wire (course website - take after completing other readings in this subsection).

  4. Statutory Damage Caps (WT, pp. 663-665, notes 2-3; Idaho Code § 6-1603);Cal. Civil Code § 3333.2; 49 U.S.C. § 28103.

  5. Environmental Damages (WT, pp. 668-669: CB & I Constructors + note 1).

  6. Death (survival and wrongful-death: WT, pp. 669-70).

  7. Liability Insurance (WT, pp. 675-76; San Jose Municipal Code § 10.32.210).

  8. Collateral Source and First-Party Insurance (WT, pp. 639-640: note 4; pp. 677-79).

  9. Cognizable Injury

  • Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 22 N.Y.3d 439 (2013) (course website).
  • Nunley v. Chelan-Douglas Health Dist., 32 Wash. App. 2d 700 (2024) (course website, skip ¶¶ 17-37).
  • “Emotions”, Invisibilia (2017) (play after completing readings in § 3.3 of this syllabus)

4: Punitive Damages

“Punitive damages” denotes a type of money award in tort cases that, when paid by the defendant, is supposed to punish the defendant in proportion to moral seriousness of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Typically, to be eligible to receive punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted purposefully (or sometimes recklessly or with conscious disregard for others safety or well being) to inflict the losses suffered. Here, we discuss the main issues associated with calculating punitive damages, including the federal constitutional law under which punitive damage awards may be declared so disproportionate as to violate the Due Process Clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution.

  1. Eligibility: Utah Code § 78B-8-201.
  2. Punitive Damages in Connecticut tutorial
  3. Constitutional Scrutiny (WT, pp. 702-706: Gore, State Farm)
  4. Liability Insurance (Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 502 P. 2d 522 (Ariz. 1972)

5: Negligence - Fundamentals

The “negligence” claim covers cases of accidental injuries in which a defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff; violates the associated “standard of care” by failing to take a precaution that, under the circumstances, the defendant could and should have taken; and such failure caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Here, we focus on the “standard of care” element of the negligence claim, emphasizing the Hand Formula approach. We also discuss how courts sometimes increase the “standard of care” for high-risk situations and adjust it for defendants with different capacities.

  1. Standard of Care (WT, pp. 117-119: Brown v. Kendall; Adams v. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208 (1919)); Mackey Complaint ¶¶ 1-8, 15-45, 71-105 (course website); The Hand Formula Approach tutorial.
  2. Heightened Standard of Care: Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420 (2000) (skip pages 428-432 and dissent); WT p. 189-191: Andrews + note 1; Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959).
  3. Adjusting the Standard of Care
    • Physical Traits (WT, pp. 145-147: Smith, Davis + note 2)
    • Children: WT, p. 150-153: Dellwo + notes 2-3; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572
    • Mental Illness (p. 155-160: Breunig + notes 2-3, Gould)

6: Negligence - Custom and Statutes

Here, we consider two different ways a plaintiff can prove that a defendant violated the “standard of care”: (1) custom: proof that the defendant, by failing to take a particular precaution, departed from the custom or accepted practice in the defendant’s trade, business or profession; or (2) negligence per se: the defendant violated a statute, where that statutory violation is of a particular type. We also discuss whether juries or judges should primarily decide whether a defendant violated the “standard of care”.

  1. Judges and Juries (WT pp. 194-200: Goodman, Holmes + notes 1-2, Pokora + notes 1-2).
  2. Custom (WT pp. 204-209: T.J. Hooper + notes 1-2; Trimarco)
  3. Negligence Per Se (WT pp. 225-231: Martin, Tedla, Restatement approach; Mackey Complaint ¶¶ 106-114 (course website); Washington Rev. Code § 5.40.050).
  4. Regulatory Compliance Defense? (WT, pp. 232-233).

7: Proving Negligence

What does it mean to say that the plaintiff proved that defendant breached the standard of care? This issue arises when a defendant argues to a trial judge that the plaintiff’s evidence does not suffice to prove breach as a matter of law. Here, we discuss five key concepts: the burden of proof, legal relevance, probative value, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof, and legal presumptions. We also discuss the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, which makes it easier for a plaintiff bringing a negligence claim to prove that the defendant violated the standard of care.

  1. Burdens and Standards of Proof

  2. Presumptions (Ga. Code Ann. § 6-2-8; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 72-2; Federal Rule of Evidence 301)

  3. Res Ipsa Loquitor (WT, pp. 243-51: Byrne, Grajales-Romero + note 1, Ybarra).

8: Cause In Fact

Not all wrongful conduct leads to someone getting injured. Moreover, absent vicarious liability of some sort, a defendant is usually only liable for harms that its own conduct causes. “Cause in Fact” refers to the issue of how likely the plaintiff’s injury would have been to occur in the counterfactual world in which, all else equal, the defendant did not commit the wrongful conduct. Inferring causation is particularly complex in cases involving multiple possible causes of the plaintiff’s injury and multiple defendants engaged in the same conduct, and often involves the use of expert opinion testimony.

  1. Introduction (WT, pp. 309-310: Grimstad + note 1).

  2. Causation

    1. pollution (WT, pp. 311-315: Stubbs + notes 1-2)
    2. case study - tobacco litigation (Milberger et al., 2006)
    3. presumptions

  1. Expert Testimony (WT, pp. 319-320: notes 4-5 (Benedectin, Daubert); Federal Rules of Evidence 701, 702, 703); (Michaels 2022)(optional).

  2. Multiple Tortfeasors, Multiple-Sufficient-Causes, Joint and Several Liability

    1. WT, pp. 328-329: Kingston + note 2
    2. substantial factor (WT, pp. 340-341)

  3. Alternatives

    1. Summers v. Tice (WT, pp. 330-331); Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agency v. Jackson, 333 Conn. 206 (2019)
    2. Market Share Liability: WT, pp. 331-338: Sindell + notes 2 (Hymowitz) and 3 (Skipworth); Ga. Stat. § 51-1-11(d),(e); Ohio Stat. § 2307.73(C).

This radio story recounts the Daubert litigation, following Smith (2020). Play it after completing the readings in this section on expert testimony.

Optional. This video (6:34) re-enacts part of an expert-witness deposition in a case involving a motorcycle accident in which the expert’s testimony is not ideal.

Optional. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows for opinion testimony of an expert witness qualified not just because of “education” or “training” but also by “knowledge, skill, [or] experience.” This implies that even absent any formal education, the proposed expert’s skill or experience alone may suffice. For a fictional example of this, see here.

9: Proximate Cause

“Proximate cause” is not really about causation at all. In general, we have to set limits on a defendant’s liability (legal responsibility) for an injurious event that the defendant, by its wrongful conduct, did in fact cause. Proximate cause doctrine primarily assigns to juries the task of determining whether the injury exceeds those limits in any particular case. And that doctrine supplies juries with the legal standard they must use to complete this task.

  1. Unexpected Harm (WT, pp. 350-358: Benn + notes 1 & 4, Polemis, Wagon Mound + note 1).
  2. Intervening Actors (WT, pp. 366-68: Nallan + note 2).
  3. Unexpected Person
    • Palsgraf Record on Appeal at 3-6 (Complaint, Answer); id. at 9-15 (Palsgraf trial testimony); id. at 16-19 (Gerhardt trial testimony); id. at 34-37 (court charge to jury).
    • Palsgraf opinion (WT, pp. 372-377).

10: Duty

The “duty of care” concept is US tort law’s other way to set limits on a defendant’s liability (legal responsibility) for an injurious event that the defendant, by its wrongful conduct, did in fact cause. “Duty of care” doctrine primarily assigns to judges the task of determining whether the injury exceeds those limits in any particular case, largely as a matter of public policy. The initial premise of American tort law is that, at common law, you do not owe a duty of care to someone to prevent or reduce the risk of harm to them that you did not create or increase, absent a “special relationship” between the two of you, or unless you voluntarily undertook to help the person who you injured. Furthermore, a common law tort duty is different from a statutory duty. Courts may, but need not, take a statutory duty as a reason for recognizing a new common-law duty in tort, even if the statute itself does not provide a private cause of action. Finally, legislatures sometimes enact a statute to provide limited tort immunity to those who voluntarily undertake to help someone.

  1. Duty to Rescue (WT, pp. 385-389: Farwell, Harper + notes 1,3).
  2. Duty and Public Policy
  • Nunley v. Chelan-Douglas Health Dist., 32 Wash. App. 2d 700 (2024) (course website, skip ¶¶ 38-67).
  • Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 22-16562, 2025 WL 80365 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (course website, skip ¶¶ 1, 3).
  1. Statutory Duty to Assist (12 Vt. Stat. § 519(a),(c); Minn. Stat. § 604A.01(1)
  2. Statutory Duty to Intervene - Colorado Rev. Stat. § 18-8-802(1.5)(a),(d).
  3. Statutory Immunity for Voluntary Undertakings: Good Samaritan Statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-557b(a), 52-557u; 12 Vt. Stat. § 519(b); Minn. Stat. § 604A.01(2); WT, pg. 403: Swenson)

11: Defenses

Here, we discuss the main defenses to negligence liability: contributory negligence, comparative negligence, liability waivers, and the doctrine of implied assumption of risk.

  1. Contributory Negligence (WT, pp. 262-263: Butterfield + note 1)
  2. Comparative Negligence
  3. Liability Waivers: Hanks v. Powder Ridge, 885 A.2d 734 (Conn. 2005) (majority op. only); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572w.
  4. Implied Assumption of Risk:

12: Intentional Torts

Here, we discuss several kinds of intentional tort claims, as well as how intentional torts differ from negligence claims.

  1. Intent (WT, pp. 19-27, Garrett + notes 1,2,4)
  2. Battery (WT, pp. 4-6: Vosburg; pp. 51-53: Fisher + note 1); Counterclaim, Mueller v. Swift, No. 1:15-cv-01974-WJM (D. Colo., filed Oct. 28, 2015) (pp. 9-14).
  3. Assault (WT, pp. 54-59: tr I. de S. & Wife + all notes, Speicher + note)
  4. Trespass to Land (WT, pp. 36-39: Dougherty + notes 1, 3-4)
  5. Defenses

What plausible tort claims, if any, exist based on this video? For each such claim, what is your best estimate of that claim’s expected value, given the information you have now?

Which intentional tort(s), if any, has anyone in this video committed?

13: Strict Liability

“Strict liability” doctrines assign liability without regard to how carefully or carelessly the defendant had acted. Here, we will discuss the origins of strict liability theories and focus two examples of such a theory: strict liability for “abnormally dangerous” animals and activities.

  1. Wild and Abnormally Dangerous Animals (WT pp. 506-509: Rhodes + note 1)
  2. Abnormally Dangerous Activities (WT pp. 509-513: Spano + notes 1-2; pp. 515-518: Indiana Harbor)

14: Product Liability

Here, we discuss the origins and development of the two main tort theories of liability for product-related injury: negligence and strict liability.

  1. Beginnings (WT pp. 557-569: MacPherson + note 1, Escola + notes 1, 3-5, Temple + notes 1-2)
  2. Manufacturing Defects (WT pp. 569-571 (Speller); Ohio Stat. §§ 2307.71, 2307.73(A), 2307.74)
  3. Design Defects
    1. Doctrine: WT pp. 574-585: Barker + notes 2, 5; Wright + notes 1-2; Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §§ 82.001, 82.005, 82.006); Ohio. Stat. § 2307.75.
    2. Case Study - Fisher-Price Baby Sleeper (Frankel 2019)
  4. Warning Defects (WT pp. 585-601: Liriano, Hood; Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §§ 82.007))
  5. Subsequent Remedial Measures: Federal Rule of Evidence 407.
  6. Case Study: Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC, 63 Cal. App. 5th 466 (2021) (majority op. only).

How would you argue that the product described in this video has a design defect?

15: Preemption

Where a statute requires x and the common law requires not x, we say that the statute preempts the common law to the contrary (thus, x is required), because statutes usually take priority over common law. When State statutes preempt State common law is a function of State law. When federal law (statute, treaty, regulation) preempts State law depends on (how judges read) the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the US Constitution. Here, we discuss how defendants in tort cases can prevail on a preemption defense to tort liability.

  1. State Law Preemption
  2. Federal Preemption (Express)
  3. Implied Preemption - WT pp. 607-611: Geier; Levine et al. (2023) (optional).